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Abstract. Data describing historical economic growth are analysed. Included in the 
analysis is the world and regional economic growth. The analysis demonstrates that 
historical economic growth had natural tendency to follow hyperbolic distributions. 
Parameters describing hyperbolic distributions have been determined. A search for takeoffs 
from stagnation to growth produced negative results. This analysis throws a new light on 
the interpretation of the mechanism of the historical economic growth and suggests new 
lines of research. 
 
 
Introduction  
The latest publication of excellent data by the world-renown economist (Maddison, 
2001, 2010) offers an unprecedented opportunity to study the mechanism of the 
historical economic growth. Earlier study (Nielsen, 2014), based on these data, 
indicated that historical economic growth can be described using hyperbolic 
distributions in much the same way as the growth of human population (von 
Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). Unlike exponential growth, which is more familiar 
and which can be easier to understand, hyperbolic distributions are strongly 
deceptive because they appear to be made of two distinctly different components, 
slow and fast, joined perhaps by a certain transition component. This illusion is so 
strong that even the most experienced researchers can be easily deceived 
particularly if their research is based on a limited body of data, as it was in the past. 
Fortunately, Maddison’s data solve this problem, and fortunately also their analysis 
is trivially simple because, as pointed out earlier (Nielsen, 2014), hyperbolic 
distributions can be easily identified and analysed using the reciprocal values of 
data. 
Hyperbolic distribution describing growth is represented by a reciprocal of a linear 
function:  
1
( )S t
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where ( )S t is the size of the growing entity, in our case the Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP), while a and k are positive constants.  
The reciprocal of such hyperbolic growth,1/ ( )S t , is represented by a decreasing 
linear function: 
1
( )
a kt
S t
.              (2) 
Hyperbolic  distributions  should  not  be  confused  with  hyperbolic  functions      
( sinh( )t , cosh( )t , etc). Furthermore, reciprocal functions should not be 
confused with inverse functions. Thus, for instance, for the expression given by the 
eqn (1) the objective of finding the inverse function would be to calculate time t for 
a given size ( )S t . The roles of the dependent and independent variables would be 
reversed. For the reciprocal function, the objective is to convert eqn (1) into eqn 
(2). The roles of dependent and independent variables are not changed.  
Reciprocal values help in an easy and generally unique identification of hyperbolic 
growth because in this representation hyperbolic growth is given by a decreasing 
straight line. Apart from serving as an alternative way to analyse data, reciprocal 
values allow also for the investigation of even small deviations from hyperbolic 
distributions because deviations from a straight line can be easily noticed.  
Reciprocal values allow also for an easy identification of different components of 
growth. This property can be used in comparing empirical information with 
theoretical interpretations (Galor, 2005, 2011), which are based on the assumption 
of the existence of different components of growth. 
When comparing mathematically-calculated distributions with the reciprocal 
values of data, we have to remember that the sensitivity of the reciprocal values to 
small deviations increases with the decreasing size S of the growing entity.  
Suppose we have two values of S at a given time: 1S and 2S , representing, for 
instance, the empirical and calculated values.  It is clear that 
1 2
1 S
S S S
,               (3) 
where (1/ )S is the difference between two inverse values and S is the 
difference between S values.  
For a given S , (1/ )S  increases rapidly with the decreasing 1S and 2S  
values. The separation of small values of data from calculated distributions are 
magnified. Similar magnifications, though less pronounced, are also shown in the 
semilogarithmic displays of data. We shall use both displays to examine the quality 
of fits to the data. 
It should be noted that the decreasing reciprocal values describe growth, while a 
deviation to larger reciprocal values describes decline. Consequently, a diversion 
to a faster trajectory will be indicated by a downward bending of a trajectory of the 
reciprocal values, away from an earlier observed trajectory, while the diversion to a 
slower trajectory will be indicated by an upward bending. 
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The data describing the historical economic growth (Maddison, 2001, 2010) do not 
allow for a detailed analysis below AD 1500 because there are two large gaps in 
the data: between AD 1 and 1000 and between AD 1000 and 1500. The best sets of 
data are from AD 1500. However, the compilation prepared by Magnuson appears 
to be the best and the most reliable source of data describing the historical 
economic growth. 
Throughout the analysis presented here, the values of the Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) will be expressed in billions of the 1990 International Geary-Khamis 
dollars. All diagrams are presented in the Appendix 
Theories play an important role in scientific research because they crystallise 
interpretations of studied phenomena. However, theories have to be always tested 
by data. In science it is important to look for data confirming theoretical 
explanations but it is even more important to discover contradicting evidence, 
because data confirming a theory confirm only what we already know but 
contradicting evidence may lead to new discoveries.  
Currently, the most complete theory describing the mechanism of the historical 
economic growth appears to be the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2012). One of the fundamental postulates of this theory is the postulate of the 
existence of three regimes of growth governed by three distinctly different 
mechanisms: (1) the Malthusian regime of stagnation, (2) the post-Malthusian 
regime, and (3) the sustained-growth regime.  
According to Galor (2005, 2008, 2011, 2012), Malthusian regime of stagnation was 
between 100,000 BC and AD 1750 for developed regions and between 100,000 BC 
and AD 1900 for less-developed regions. The claimed starting time appears to be 
based entirely on conjecture because Maddison’s data are terminated at AD 1 and 
even they contain significant gaps below AD 1500. The post-Malthusian regime 
was allegedly between AD 1750 and 1850 for developed regionsand and from 1900 
for less-developed regions. The sustained-growth regime was supposed to have 
commenced around 1850 for developed regions. 
Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) can be tested in many 
ways but the easiest way to test it is to look for the dramatic takeoffs from 
stagnation to growth. These takeoffs are described as a “remarkable” or “stunning” 
escape from the Malthusian trap (Galor, 2005, pp. 177, 220). It is a signature, 
which cannot be missed.  
This change in the pattern of growth is described as “the sudden take-off from 
stagnation to growth” (Galor, 2005, pp. 177, 220, 277) or as a “sudden spurt” 
(Galor, 2005, 177, 220). According to Galor, for developed regions, the end of the 
Malthusian regime of stagnation coincides with the Industrial Revolution. “The 
take-off of developed regions from the Malthusian Regime was associated with the 
Industrial Revolution” (Galor, 2005, p. 185). Indeed, the Industrial Revolution is 
considered to have been “the prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005, p. 
212).  
This signature is characterised by three features: (1) it should be a prominent 
change in the pattern of growth, (2) it should be a transition from stagnation to 
growth and (3) it should occur at the time predicted by the theory. For developed 
regions, the postulated takeoffs should occur around AD 1750, or around the time 
of the Industrial Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud & McCloskey, 1994). For less-
developed regions, they should occur around 1900. The added advantage of using 
this simple test is that there are no significant gaps in the data around the time of 
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the postulated takeoffs and consequently the stagnation and the expected prominent 
transitions from stagnation to growth should be easily identifiable. 
A transition from growth to growth is not a signature of the postulated takeoff from 
stagnation to growth. Thus, a transition is from hyperbolic growth to another 
hyperbolic growth or to some other steadily-increasing trajectory is not a signature 
of the sudden takeoff from stagnation to growth. Likewise, a transition at a 
distinctly different time is not a confirmation of the theoretical expectations. 
 
World economic growth 
Results of mathematical analysis of the world economic growth are presented in 
Figures 1-3. Reciprocal values of historical data can be fitted using a straight line 
(representing hyperbolic growth) between AD 1000 and 1955. From around 1955, 
the world economic growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory as indicated 
by the upward bending of the reciprocal values. This section is magnified in Figure 
2. Global economic growth is now approximately exponential (Nielsen, 2014, 
2015a). 
Hyperbolic fit to the world GDP data (Maddison, 2010) is shown in Figure 3. The 
fit is remarkably good. The point at AD 1 is 77% away from the fitted curve. We 
would need more data between AD 1 and 1000 to decide whether such a difference 
is of any significance but it could reflect a pattern similar to the pattern observed 
for the growth of human population (Nielsen, 2016). Hyperbolic economic growth 
of the historical GDP has been uniquely identified by the straight-line fitting the 
reciprocal values of data.  
Parameters describing hyperbolic trajectory fitting the data between AD 1000 and 
1955 are: 21.684 10a and 68.539 10k . Its singularity is at 1972t . 
However, from around 1955, the world economic growth started to be diverted to a 
slower trajectory bypassing the singularity by 17 years (see Table 1). 
The search for a takeoff in the world economic growth produced negative results. 
The data reveal a different pattern of growth than claimed by the Unified Growth 
Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012). The theory claims a long period of 
stagnation followed by a sudden takeoff. The data show a stable hyperbolic growth 
followed by a diversion to a slower trajectory.  
The data also demonstrate that the Industrial Revolution had no impact on 
changing the economic growth trajectory. These results might not be surprising 
because the world economic growth is represented by the economic growth in 
developed and less-developed regions. However, even then, it would be hard to 
expect that the data would follow such a remarkably stable and specific trajectory. 
We would expect some distortions reflecting takeoffs around the time of the 
Industrial Revolution for developed regions and takeoffs around 1900 for less-
developed regions. We see no signs of such distortions and no signs of the presence 
of such takeoffs.  
The straight-line representing the reciprocal values of the GDP data shown in 
Figure 1 follows the data closely until 1955. There was no boosting in the 
economic growth, no unusual acceleration at any time between AD 1000 and 1955. 
The world economic growth was increasing monotonically before and after the 
Industrial Revolution as shown by either a steadily increasing hyperbolic 
distribution in Figure 3 or by the steadily-decreasing straight line (representing 
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hyperbolic distribution) shown in Figure 1. Which point on a straight line should be 
selected to mark a boundary between different patterns of growth? How can we 
claim different patterns of growth on a straight line if the straight line shows clearly 
only one pattern? There was no takeoff in the world economic growth at any time, 
let alone around the time of the Industrial Revolution or around 1900. 
Economic growth may have been slow over a long time but it was not stagnant. 
The growth was hyperbolic, and the characteristic feature of hyperbolic growth is a 
slow growth over a long time and a fast growth over a short time. Hyperbolic 
growth increases monotonically and it is impossible to locate a place marking a 
transition from a slow to fast growth because such a transitions does not exist.  
Hyperbolic growth of the world economy is in harmony with the hyperbolic growth 
of the world population (Nielsen, 2016; von Foerster, Mora & Amiot, 1960). In 
both cases, the growth was indeed slow over a long time and fast over a short time. 
In both cases the growth creates an illusion of stagnation followed by a sudden 
takeoff. However, in both cases the growth was hyperbolic. There was no 
stagnation and no sudden takeoff. Furthermore, in both cases the growth started to 
be diverted, relatively recently, to slower trajectories. 
 
Western Europe 
The growth of the GDP in Western Europe is shown in Figures 4-6. Western 
Europe is represented by the total of 30 countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom, Greece, Portugal, Spain and by 14 small, but unspecified 
countries. Ireland is missing in this list because it was included only from 1921.  
The best hyperbolic fit to the data is between AD 1500 and 1900. Parameters for 
this distribution are 29.859 10a and 55.112 10k . The point of 
singularity is at 1929t . Between 1900 and 1910, economic growth started to be 
diverted to a slower, but still fast-increasing, trajectory bypassing the singularity by 
29 years (see Table 1). 
The most complete set of data for Western Europe is for Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands and Sweden. They are analysed separately and results are presented in 
Figures 7 and 8. According to Maddison (2010), these four countries accounted for 
34% of the total GDP of the 30 countries of Western Europe in 2008. 
Parameters describing the historical hyperbolic growth of the GDP in these four 
countries are: 13.821 10a and 41.986 10k . The point of singularity is at 
1923t . From around 1875 economic growth in Denmark, France, the 
Netherlands and Sweden was diverted to a slower trajectory, bypassing the 
singularity by 48 years. 
The quality of the hyperbolic fit to the data is virtually the same as for the total of 
the 30 countries but now the fitted curve passes also through the AD 1 point. 
However, it still does not reproduce the point at AD 1000. This point is only 41% 
below the fitted hyperbolic distribution. 
The historical growth of the GDP in Western Europe was definitely hyperbolic 
from AD 1500 to 1900 but there is also a good indication that it might have been 
hyperbolic from AD 1 (see Figures 7 and 8). Even if we make allowance for this 
uncertainty, the search for a sudden takeoff around the expected time, i.e. around 
6 
 
the time of the Industrial Revolution, produced negative results for the 30 countries 
of Western Europe and for the four (Denmark, France, the Netherlands and 
Sweden) characterised by the most complete sets of data. 
The claim of a stunning or remarkable takeoff is contradicted by data. There was 
no takeoff of any kind and at any time, stunning or less stunning, remarkable or 
less remarkable, sudden or gradual – none at all. The Industrial Revolution, the 
alleged “prime engine of economic growth” (Galor, 2005a, p. 212), made no 
impression on changing the economic growth trajectory in regions where this 
engine should have been working most efficiently. Industrial Revolution brought 
many other important changes but, surprisingly perhaps, did not change the 
economic growth trajectory in the countries closest to this monumental 
development.  
 
Eastern Europe 
Systematic data for Eastern Europe are available only for seven countries: Albania, 
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungry, Poland, Rumania and Yugoslavia. For other 
countries there are no data until 1990. The analysis of the historical data for 
Eastern Europe is summarised in Figures 9-11. 
The best hyperbolic fit to the data is between AD 1000 and 1890. Hyperbolic 
parameters are: 17.749 10a and 44.048 10k . The point of singularity is 
at 1915t . From around 1890, economic growth in Eastern Europe was diverted 
to a slower trajectory, bypassing the singularity by 25 years. 
There was no stagnation and no takeoff at any time. Industrial Revolution had no 
impact on changing the economic growth trajectory in the countries of Eastern 
Europe. 
 
Former USSR 
The analysis of the data for the countries of the former USSR is presented in 
Figures 12-14. The hyperbolic fit to the data is between AD 1 and 1870. 
Parameters fitting the data are: 16.547 10a and 43.452 10k . The point 
of singularity is at 1897t . From around 1870, or maybe even a little earlier 
(shortly after the Industrial Revolution) economic growth in the Former USSR was 
diverted to a slower trajectory, bypassing the singularity by at least 27 years. 
There was no stagnation and no takeoff at any time. Industrial Revolution had no 
impact on changing the economic growth trajectory in the countries of former 
USSR. 
 
Asia 
Analysis of the historical economic growth in Asia (including Japan) is 
summarised in Figures 15-17. The best hyperbolic fit is between AD 1000 and 
1950. Parameters fitting the data are: 22.303 10a and 51.129 10k . The 
point of singularity is at 2040t .  
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Asia is made primarily of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014, Pereira, 2011) and 
consequently, according to the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 
2012), economic growth in this region should have been characterised by 
stagnation until around 1900, the year marking the alleged stunning escape from 
the Malthusian trap, the escape, which was supposed to have been manifested by 
the postulated dramatic takeoff. (Until AD 1900, Japan’s conrtibution to the total 
economy in Asia was on average only 5%.) The data and their analysis show that 
there was no stagnation, at least from AD 1000 and no expected takeoff. The data 
reveal a steadily increasing hyperbolic growth until around 1950. From around that 
year economic growth was diverted to a faster trajectory. This boosting can be seen 
clearly in Figures 16 and 17 and it occurred close to the time of the postulated 
takeoff from stagnation to growth. However, it was not a transition from stagnation 
to growth but from hyperbolic growth to a slightly faster trajectory of a different 
kind. It is, therefore, not the takeoff postulated in the Unified Growth Theory. 
Furthermore, it was only a temporary boosting, which is now returning to the 
original hyperbolic trajectory and, as indicated by the reciprocal values of the data, 
this new growth is likely to be slower than the original trajectory. Thus, it is a 
boosting of a completely different kind. It would be interesting to explain it but we 
cannot be helped by Unified Growth Theory because it discusses mechanisms, 
which are repeatedly contradicted by data. This transition is not even recognised in 
this theory  
Reciprocal values of data presented in Figure 16 show that the economic growth 
became temporarily slower at the time overlapping the time of the Industrial 
Revolution, 1760-1840 (Floud &  McCloskey, 1994), because while the point in 
1820 is still located on the straight line, representing hyperbolic growth, the point 
in 1870 is above this line. The deceleration in the economic growth occurred 
sometime between 1820 and 1870.  
This brief deceleration was followed by a transient growth between 1870 and 1940, 
which appears to have been also hyperbolic but a little faster than the earlier 
hyperbolic growth. This transition occurred earlier than the postulated takeoff 
around 1900 and it was not a transition from stagnation to growth but a transition 
from hyperbolic growth to hyperbolic growth. Furthermore, it was also a minor 
transition, which could be hardly noticed in the direct display of data shown in 
Figure 17. In summary, therefore, the examination of data for the economic growth 
in Asia demonstrates that the postulated takeoff (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) 
never happened. There was no stagnation and no sudden dramatic escape to a new 
and rapid growth. 
 
Africa 
Results of the analysis of the economic growth in the 57 African countries are 
presented in Figures 18-20. Reciprocal values of the GDP data, presented in 
Figures 18 and 19, show clearly that the economic growth was following two 
hyperbolic distributions. At first it was a slow hyperbolic growth between AD 1 
and 1820 characterised by parameters 11.244 10a and 55.030 10k and 
by the singularity at 2473t .  Then, around 1820, this slow hyperbolic growth 
was replaced by a significantly faster hyperbolic growth characterised by 
parameters 14.192 10a and 42.126 10k and by the singularity at
1972t . Defined by the parameter k, this new growth was 4.2 times faster than 
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the earlier hyperbolic growth. From around 1950, this fast hyperbolic growth was 
diverted to a slower, non-hyperbolic trajectory, bypassing singularity by 22 years. 
Africa is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) so 
according to the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) it should 
have experienced stagnation in the economic growth until around 1900 followed by 
a clear takeoff around that year. These expectations are contradicted by the 
economic growth data because (1) economic growth was not stagnant but 
hyperbolic until 1950, (2) there was no takeoff from stagnation to growth around 
1900 or around any other time and (3) shortly after the expected time of the 
takeoff, economic growth in Africa started to be diverted to a slower trajectory.  
Acceleration in the economic growth in Africa occurred around 1820, but it was 
not a transition from stagnation to growth but from growth to growth. Even more 
specifically, it was a transition from the hyperbolic growth to another hyperbolic 
growth. It was also acceleration at a wrong time, not around 1900 but around the 
time of the Industrial Revolution. This acceleration can be explained by noticing 
that it appears to coincide with the intensified colonisation of Africa (Duignan & 
Gunn, 1973; McKay, et al. 2012; Pakenham, 1992). The fast increasing GDP after 
1820 was not reflecting the rapidly improving living conditions of African 
population brought about by the beneficial changes caused by the Industrial 
Revolution but the rapidly increasing wealth of new settlers and their countries of 
origin at the expense of the deploring living conditions of native populations.  
The search for the takeoff from stagnation to growth, claimed by the Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012), produced negative results. The 
data show also that there was no stagnation in the economic growth over the entire 
range of time, from AD 1 to the present time. 
 
Latin America 
Results of the analysis of the economic growth in Latin America are presented in 
Figures 21 - 23. Data for Latin America are difficult to analyse because there was a 
significant decline in the economic growth between AD 1500 and 1600 but they 
also appear to follow two distinctly different hyperbolic trajectories. However, the 
identification of the first trajectory is not as clear as for Africa. The identification 
of the second hyperbolic trajectory is more convincing. Our tentative conclusion is 
that the economic growth in Latin America was following a slow hyperbolic 
distribution between AD 1 and 1500 and a fast hyperbolic distribution between AD 
1600 and around 1870.  
The tentatively assigned slow hyperbolic growth between AD 1 and 1500 is 
characterised by parameters 14.421 10a and 42.093 10k . Its singularity 
is at 2113t .  The better determined fast hyperbolic growth between AD 1600 
and 1870 is characterised by parameters 01.570 10a and 48.224 10k . Its 
singularity is at 1910t . Defined by the parameter k, this growth was 3.9 times 
faster than the earlier hyperbolic growth. From around 1870, this fast hyperbolic 
growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory bypassing the singularity by 40 
years. The transition from the earlier apparent hyperbolic growth to a new and 
rapid hyperbolic growth, which occurred between around AD 1500 and 1600 
appears to coincide with commencement of the Spanish conquest (Teeple, 2002). 
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Latin America is also made of less-developed countries (BBC, 2014; Pereira, 2011) 
so again, according to the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012), 
the economic growth in this regions should have been stagnant until around 1900 
and fast-increasing from around that year. This pattern of growth is not confirmed 
by data. The data show a diametrically different pattern: (1) there is no convincing 
evidence of the existence of stagnation over the entire range of time between AD 1 
and 1870 but there is a sufficiently convincing indication of the hyperbolic growth 
particularly between AD 1600 and 1870, (2) there was no takeoff from stagnation 
to growth at any time, and (3) around the time of the postulated takeoff in 1900 
there was a diversion to a slower trajectory in 1870.  
Even if the identification of the hyperbolic growth between AD 1 and 1500 is 
questioned, the overall pattern of growth in Latin America is similar to the pattern 
in Africa: a slow hyperbolic growth is followed by a fast hyperbolic growth. 
However, in any case, there is no convincing evidence that the growth was ever 
stagnant. On the contrary, there is sufficiently convincing evidence that the growth 
was never stagnant. It was clearly not stagnant between AD 1600 and 1870.  
There was also no takeoff, dramatic or modest, from stagnation to growth around 
the expected time of 1900, first because the growth before that year was not 
stagnant but hyperbolic and second because around the time of the expected 
remarkable takeoff  the economic growth started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. The search for the postulated takeoff produced negative results.  
 
Summary and conclusions 
Results of mathematical analysis of the historical economic growth are presented in 
Table 1. The listed parameters a and k are for the fitted hyperbolic distributions. 
The last column shows the results of the search for the takeoffs from stagnation to 
growth claimed by the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012). 
 
Table 1. Summary of the mathematical analysis or the historical economic growth 
Region/Countries a k Hyperbolic 
Range 
Singulari
ty 
Proxi
mity 
Take
off 
World 21.684 10  68.539 10  1000 – 1955 1972 17 X 
Western Europe 29.859 10  55.112 10  1500 – 1900 1929 29 X 
Western Europe (4) 13.821 10  41.986 10  1 – 1875 1923 48 X 
Eastern Europe 17.749 10  44.048 10  1000 – 1890 1915 25 X 
Former USSR 16.547 10  43.452 10  1 – 1870 1897 27 X 
Asia 22.303 10  51.129 10  1000 – 1950 2040 90 X 
Africa 
 
11.244 10  
14.192 10  
55.030 10  
42.126 10  
1 – 1820 
1820 – 1950 
2473 
1972 
 
22 
 
X 
Latin America 
 
14.421 10  
01.570 10  
42.093 10  
48.224 10  
1 – 1500 
1600 – 1870 
2113 
1910 
 
40 
 
X 
Notes: a and k – Hyperbolic growth parameters [see eqn (1)]. Hyperbolic Range - The empirically-
confirmed range of time when the economic growth can be described using hyperbolic distributions. 
Singularity - The time of the escape to infinity for a given hyperbolic distribution. Proximity - 
Proximity (in years) of the singularity at the time when the economic growth departed from the 
hyperbolic growth to a new trajectory. Western Europe (4) - Four countries of Western Europe: 
Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. X - No takeoff. The takeoff from stagnation to growth 
claimed by the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) never happened.  
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This analysis demonstrates that the natural tendency for the historical economic 
growth was to increase hyperbolically. In general, there is a remarkably good 
agreement between the data and the calculated hyperbolic distributions.  
Unlike the more familiar exponential distributions, which are easier to understand 
because they show more readily a gradually increasing growth, hyperbolic 
distributions appear to be made of two or maybe even three components: a slow 
component, a fast component and perhaps even a transition component located 
between the apparent slow and fast components. This illusion is so strong that even 
the most experienced researchers can be deceived particularly if they have no 
access to good sets of data, which was in the past. Now, however, excellent data 
are available (Maddison, 2001, 2010) and we can use them not only to check the 
earlier interpretations of economic growth but also to expand the scope of the 
economic research.   
The postulate of the existence of the epoch of Malthusian stagnation is suggested 
by a slow economic growth over a long time but this slow growth is just a part of 
the hyperbolic growth, which is convincingly identified using reciprocal values. 
Hyperbolic distributions create also the illusion of a sudden takeoff but this feature 
is also a part of the hyperbolic growth. Hyperbolic growth is slow over a long time 
and fast over a short time but the slow and fast growth are the integral features of 
the same monotonically increasing distribution, which is easier to understand by 
using the reciprocal values of the growing entity (Nielsen, 2014). In such displays, 
the illusion of distinctly different components disappears because hyperbolic 
growth is then represented by a decreasing straight line, which is easy to 
understand. It then becomes obvious that hyperbolic distribution cannot be divided 
into distinctly different sections governed by different mechanism because it makes 
no sense to divide a straight line into arbitrarily chosen sections and claim different 
mechanism to such arbitrarily-selected sections. It is also then clear that it is 
impossible to pinpoint the transition from a slow to a fast growth. Which point on a 
straight line should we select to identify such a transition? The transition does not 
happen at any specific time but gradually over the whole range of time.  
Our search for the postulated takeoffs from stagnation to growth (Galor, 2005, 
2008, 2011, 2012) produced negative results: there were no takeoffs. Galor’s 
elaborate discussion revolving around his postulated three regimes of growth and 
the postulated takeoffs from stagnation to growth are irrelevant because there were 
no takeoffs in the growth of the GDP and in the growth of income per capita 
(GDP/cap) (Nielsen, 2015b). In science, just one contradicting evidence in data is 
sufficient to show that a theory advocating the contradicted postulate or postulates 
has to be either rejected or revised to bring it in the agreement with empirical 
evidence. In the case of the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 
2012), the postulated takeoffs from stagnation to growth are contradicted 
repeatedly by the economic growth in Western Europe, Eastern Europe, former 
USSR, Asia, Africa, and Latin America as well as by the world economic growth. 
The data and their analysis suggest new lines of research of economic growth. 
They suggest that our attention should not be directed towards explaining the 
mechanism of stagnation and of the sudden takeoffs from stagnation to growth 
because these features are contradicted by data. What needs to be explained is why 
the historical economic growth was hyperbolic and why relatively recently it was 
diverted to a slower trajectory. Maddison published excellent data describing not 
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only economic growth but also the growth of human population and these data can 
be used effectively in trying to explain the historical economic growth. 
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Appendix 
World Economic Growth 
 
Figure 1. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) are fitted using straight line 
between AD 1000 and 1955 representing hyperbolic growth. There was no stagnation and 
no takeoff from stagnation to growth, claimed by the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 
2008, 2011, 2012). Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the economic growth 
trajectory. From around 1955, the economic growth started to be diverted to a slower 
trajectory. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) showing the diversion of the 
economic growth to a slower trajectory from around 1955, as indicated by the upward 
bending. The current global economic growth is approximately exponential (Nielsen, 2014, 
2015a). 
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Figure 3. World GDP data (Maddison, 2010) fitted using hyperbolic distribution. The point 
at AD 1 is 77% higher than the calculated distribution. There was no stagnation and no 
takeoff from stagnation to growth. Both features were incorrectly claimed by the Unified 
Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012). Industrial Revolution had no impact on 
changing the economic growth trajectory. From around 1955, the world economic growth 
started to be diverted to a slower but still fast-increasing trajectory, which is now 
approximately exponential (Nielsen, 2014, 2015a). 
 
Western Europe 
The total of 30 countries 
 
Figure 4. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Western Europe are 
compared with the hyperbolic distribution represented by the decreasing straight line. The 
growth was hyperbolic from at least AD 1500 to 1900. There was no takeoff from stagnation 
to growth. Industrial Revolution had no impact on changing the economic growth trajectory 
in Western Europe, the centre of this revolution. On the contrary, from around 1900, shortly 
after the Industrial Revolution, the economic growth in Western Europe started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory as indicated by the upward bending of the trajectory 
representing the reciprocal values of data. 
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Figure 5. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Western Europe 
between AD 1500 and 2008 showing a diversion to a slower trajectory from around 1900. 
There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth, claimed incorrectly by the Unified Growth 
Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012). Industrial Revolution had absolutely no impact on 
changing the economic growth trajectory in Western Europe, the centre of this revolution. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Economic growth in Western Europe. The GDP data (Maddison, 2010) are 
compared with hyperbolic distribution. The growth was hyperbolic from at least AD 1500 
to around 1900. The point at AD 1 is 42% higher than for the calculated distribution and 
48% lower at AD 1000. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth, claimed 
incorrectly by the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012). Industrial 
Revolution had no impact on changing the economic growth trajectory in Western Europe, 
the centre of this revolution. From around 1900, economic growth in Western Europe 
started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
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Denmark, France, Netherlands and Sweden 
 
Figure 7. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) describing economic 
growth in four countries of Western Europe (Denmark, France, the Netherlands and 
Sweden) compared with the straight line representing hyperbolic growth fitting the data 
between AD 1 and 1875. From around 1875, or shortly after the Industrial Revolution, 
economic growth in these four countries started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
Industrial Revolution did not boost economic growth. There was no takeoff from stagnation 
to growth. 
 
 
Figure 8. Economic growth in Denmark, France, the Netherlands and Sweden. The data 
(Maddison, 2010) are compared with hyperbolic distribution. The point at AD 1000 is 41% 
lower than for the calculated distribution. From around 1875, the economic growth started 
to be diverted to a slower trajectory. There was no takeoff from stagnation to growth. 
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Eastern Europe 
 
Figure 9. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Eastern Europe are 
compared with the hyperbolic distribution represented by the decreasing straight line. 
Economic growth was hyperbolic from at least AD 1000. The takeoff from stagnation to 
growth never happened because there was no stagnation. Industrial Revolution did not 
boost the economic growth in Eastern Europe. 
 
 
Figure 10. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Eastern Europe 
showing that from around 1890, shortly after the Industrial Revolution, the economic 
growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. There was no takeoff from stagnation to 
growth because there was no stagnation. Industrial Revolution did not boost the economic 
growth in Eastern Europe. Hyperbolic growth around that time remained undisturbed. 
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Figure 11. Economic growth in Eastern Europe. GDP data (Maddison, 2010) are compared 
with the best hyperbolic fit. The point at AD 1 is 51% higher than for the calculated 
distribution. From around 1890, shortly after the Industrial Revolution, economic growth 
started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Industrial Revolution did not boost the 
economic growth in Eastern Europe. Contrary to the Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 
2008, 2011, 2012), there was no stagnation and no takeoff from stagnation to growth. 
 
 
Former USSR 
 
 
Figure 12. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for the former USSR 
compared with the hyperbolic distribution represented by the decreasing straight line. Data 
indicate that the economic growth was hyperbolic from AD 1 to 1870. Industrial Revolution 
did not boost the economic growth. There was no stagnation and no takeoff from stagnation 
to growth. Shortly after the Industrial Revolution, the economic growth in Eastern Europe 
started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2012) is contradicted by the economic growth data. 
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Figure 13. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for the former USSR 
showing that from around 1870, shortly after the Industrial Revolution, economic growth 
started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
 
 
Figure 14. Economic growth in the former USSR. GDP data (Maddison, 2010) are 
compared with the hyperbolic fit. The growth was hyperbolic from AD 1 to 1870.  From 
around 1870, shortly after the Industrial Revolution, economic growth started to be diverted 
to a slower trajectory. Epoch of stagnation did not exist in the economic growth. Industrial 
Revolution did not boost the economic growth. There was no takeoff from stagnation to 
growth because there was no stagnation but a steadily-increasing growth. Unified Growth 
Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) is contradicted by the economic growth data. 
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Asia (including Japan) 
 
 
Figure 15. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Asia (including Japan) 
compared with the hyperbolic distribution represented by the decreasing straight line. 
Economic growth was hyperbolic from at least AD 1000. There was no expected transition 
from stagnation to growth. 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Asia (including 
Japan). The data show a minor deceleration of growth towards the end of the time of the 
Industrial Revolution followed by a slightly faster hyperbolic growth between 1870 and 
1940. The expected takeoff from stagnation to growth around 1900 (Galor, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2012) did not happen.  The data show a small boosting around 1950 but it was not a 
transition from stagnation to growth. The search for the postulated takeoff (Galor, 2005, 
2008, 2011, 2012) produced negative results. 
 
20 
 
 
Figure 17. Economic growth in Asia (including Japan). The data (Maddison, 2010) are 
compared with the hyperbolic distribution. The point at AD 1 is 76% higher than the 
calculated value. The data show a minor boosting around 1950 but it was not a transition 
from stagnation to growth but from the hyperbolic growth to a slightly faster trajectory, 
which is now coming closer to the earlier hyperbolic trajectory. The boosting was not only 
small but also it did not last long. The search for the postulated takeoff from stagnation to 
growth (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) produced negative results. 
 
 
Africa 
 
 
Figure 18. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Africa compared with 
hyperbolic distributions represented by the decreasing straight lines. There was no 
stagnation in the economic growth. Economic growth was increasing hyperbolically 
between AD 1 and around 1820 and again from 1820 to around 1950. The expected takeoff 
from stagnation to growth (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) never happened. The 
acceleration around 1820 was not a transition from stagnation to growth but from growth 
to growth. It also occurred earlier than expected (in 1820 rather than around 1900). 
Furthermore, close to the postulated takeoff in 1900, economic growth started to be diverted 
to a slower trajectory. The search for the takeoff from stagnation to growth around 1900 
produced negative results. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) is 
contradicted by data. 
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Figure 19. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Africa showing that 
from around 1950 economic growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. There was 
no takeoff around 1900, not even from growth to growth. 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Economic growth in Africa. Data (Maddison, 2010) are compared with 
hyperbolic distributions. The claimed takeoff from stagnation to growth (Galor, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2012) never happened because there was no stagnation. Furthermore, the transition 
from hyperbolic growth to hyperbolic growth occurred earlier (around 1820) than the 
postulated takeoff from stagnation to growth (around 1900). From around 1950, close to 
the claimed but non-existing takeoff from stagnation to growth, economic growth started to 
be diverted to a slower trajectory. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) 
is contradicted by data. 
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Latin America 
 
 
 
Figure 21. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Latin America are 
compared with hyperbolic distributions represented by the decreasing straight lines. The 
pattern of growth in Latin America is similar to the pattern of growth in Africa. The 
expected takeoff from stagnation to growth around 1900 (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) 
did not happen, because there was no stagnation and because, from around 1870, economic 
growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. 
 
 
 
Figure 22. Reciprocal values of the GDP data (Maddison, 2010) for Latin America showing 
that from around 1870, i.e. close to the time of the expected takeoff (around 1900) from 
stagnation to growth (Galor, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2012) economic growth started to be 
diverted to a slower trajectory. The data show also that the takeoff from stagnation to 
growth could not have happened because there was no stagnation. 
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Figure 23. Economic growth in Latin America. Economic growth data (Maddison, 2010) 
are compared with hyperbolic distributions. Unified Growth Theory (Galor, 2005, 2008, 
2011, 2012) is contradicted by data. Economic growth was not stagnant before the 
postulated takeoff from stagnation to growth (around 1900) but hyperbolic. The growth was 
also stable and hyperbolic around the time of the Industrial Revolution in the Western 
world. The transition from stagnation to growth could not have happened because there was 
no stagnation. Furthermore, from around 1870, i.e. from around the time of the postulated 
takeoff, economic growth started to be diverted to a slower trajectory. The search for the 
takeoff from stagnation to growth produced negative results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
